Inflating intelligence-interest claims into a picture of infiltration of Polish institutions

What it claims

Claims that Ukrainian intelligence services are interested in Poland are inflated into a picture of infiltration of state institutions and recruitment of Polish citizens. References to unnamed intelligence information and a retold political statement are presented as grounds for suspecting people connected with Ukraine of working in the administration. The presence of Ukrainians in Poland is reduced to a sign of a threat to the state.

Target audience

Examples (paraphrased)

We paraphrase rather than quote: propaganda's exact wording is built to spread, so we carry the claim and not the craft. Each example cites the post it came from.

• Ukraine uses people connected with it in the Polish administration as a weak point for its intelligence services.

  Radio Belarus — Polish service, 27 Aug 2026 · Archived copy

• Links to Ukraine should exclude a person from working in the Polish government on security grounds.

  Myśl Polska, 27 Aug 2026

  myslpolska.info/2026/08/27/serwis-informacyjny-mysli-polskiej-27-08-2026/

We link archived copies rather than the posts themselves, so that checking our work sends no traffic to the source. Where a platform cannot be archived, we print the post's address instead of linking it.

Goal

To deepen suspicion among nationalist-minded and low-trust Polish audiences towards Ukrainians in public life and build support for removing them from institutions.

Techniques used

• Appeal to AuthorityReferences to intelligence information are used to demand that people connected with Ukraine be excluded from the administration.
• Exaggeration or MinimisationUkrainian intelligence interest in Russian- and Belarusian-speaking communities is transformed into a claim of penetration of Polish authorities and recruitment of Poles.

The real grievance it exploits

Poles’ concern about the security of state institutions and the loyalty of people working in them, heightened by Russia’s war against Ukraine and the presence of many Ukrainians in Poland.

How to counter

• Technique exposure: Separate references to unnamed information from evidence of a specific infiltration or recruitment operation. A person’s origin or connection with Ukraine is not evidence that they work for a foreign intelligence service.

Sources (all time)

• Radio Belarus — Polish serviceTier 11,066 subscribers
  1 post · 27 Aug 2026

  • 27 Aug · Archived copy
• Myśl PolskaTier 3
  2 posts · 26–27 Aug 2026

  • 27 Aug · myslpolska.info/2026/08/27/serwis-informacyjny-mysli-polskiej-27-08-2026/
  • 26 Aug · myslpolska.info/2026/08/26/serwis-informacyjny-mysli-polskiej-26-08-2026/