Source vetting

We never monitor an unconfirmed identity. Every source in our registry has (a) a verified live handle and (b) a named, checkable receipt for its link to a state or to state media. Scope is set by the direction test, not by source type: a channel is monitored for the narratives it carries — not simply for being “pro-Russian”.

What counts as a link. A documented relationship at the level of employment, funding, syndication, or editorial partnership. What does not count, however strongly it reads: sharing the same opinions, being cited or amplified by Russian state media, one-off guest appearances, and credibility ratings such as “questionable source”. Those describe an editorial line, not a relationship.

A link may be historical, and we date it. A documented tie that has since lapsed is a reason to keep reading a source, not a reason to stop: there is a precedent, and that is enough to keep the source in view. So every receipt carries its dates, and you can see for yourself whether it describes something current or something from 2017. What we never do is present a lapsed tie as a live one.

We publish what is documented, and what isn't. Where a monitor has found that a source was used without its knowledge — its material copied by a covert operation, say — the receipt says so. Being monitored is not an allegation about the owner, and we never imply a sanction, indictment, or conviction that does not exist.

Sources are classified into three attribution tiers:

The full list of every source with its tier and evidence sits in the six rosters: Sources in Ukraine, Sources in the West, Sources — US midterms, Sources — United Kingdom, Sources — Germany and Sources — Poland.