Sources — Poland
Outlets with a documented tie to Russian or Belarusian influence operations — current or historical — publishing to Polish audiences. Each entry carries a dated, citable receipt.
What this focus admits, and why — Poland monitoring. The T1–T3 attribution tiers — source vetting.
Every source here was checked and measured, not assumed. Before launch we opened each channel and each feed by hand: of four channels proposed by outside research, three did not exist at all — despite having been given subscriber counts and posting dates. We then ran each surviving source's real posts through the analysis to see whether it actually finds Poland-directed narratives in them. A source is listed here only after that check. The roster expands in waves.
What we rejected, and why. The Polish-language feed of the Belarusian state agency BelTA is live and publishes daily, but almost all of it is Belarusian domestic news in translation; the language does not make material Poland-directed. Another Polish site was held back because only part of what it publishes concerns this focus at all. Both remain candidates for later waves — they are not “bad sources”, it simply is not yet established that they address a Polish audience.
T3 attribution: some sources in this focus are documented by independent monitors, journalistic investigations, or official records that carry no designation against the source itself. Each entry states exactly what was documented and by whom; we never attribute to a source a sanction, charge or conviction that does not exist. Where a designation names a parent outlet rather than the specific channel, we say so plainly.
Telegram
Public channels run by Polish-language operations or official missions. Syto reads only their open posts.
| Channel | Tier | Country | What it is | Attribution & sources |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Radio Belarus — Polish service @radiobialorus | T1 | — | The Polish-language service of Belarusian state radio, aimed at Polish listeners. Its accounts were opened just before Poland's 2023 parliamentary election and were active around the 2025 presidential campaign. | Its parent company, the Belarusian state television and radio company Belteleradio, is designated by the European Union in Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/876 of 3 June 2022, which states that the stations it supervises are actively spreading propaganda. The Polish-language accounts were identified and their election targeting documented by the DFRLab and Alliance4Europe in May 2025. |
Russian Embassy in Poland (Telegram) @rusembpol | T2 | — | The Telegram channel of Russia's embassy in Warsaw. We read it as a primary source: it is the Russian state speaking in its own name. | This is an official diplomatic mission of the Russian Federation. No attribution finding is needed or claimed: it is monitored because it is the state itself. |
InfoDefense (Polish) @infodefPOLAND | T3 | — | The Polish-language branch of a network publishing in more than thirty languages, which translates pro-Kremlin military commentary for local audiences. | The InfoDefense network was documented by the DFRLab as a coordinated multilingual operation; its Polish channel was named in BBC News reporting of 1 July 2025. |
Niezależny Dziennik Polityczny @ndp_pl | T3 | — | A Polish-language outlet that presents itself as an independent political daily but uses invented journalist identities. It originated the fabricated claim that thousands of Poles had died fighting in Ukraine. | Attributed to a Russian information operation by Google Threat Intelligence Group in 2025, and documented earlier by the DFRLab and the Stanford Internet Observatory. Its website was blocked by Poland's Internal Security Agency (ABW) in 2022. |
Układ Warszawski (ex-News Front Polska) @uklad_warszawski | T3 | — | A Polish-language channel that began in 2022 under the name of a Russian outlet and was renamed in 2023. It publishes on Polish politics, refugees, and Poland's relations with the EU and NATO. | Detector Media reconstructed the channel's history in an investigation published on 2 April 2026, showing it was created as News Front Polska in May 2022 and renamed in August 2023, with its old description still naming the News Front editorial bot. News Front itself was designated by the US Treasury on 15 April 2021 for acting on behalf of Russia's FSB. That designation names the parent outlet; the link to this channel comes from the published channel history. |
UKR LEAKS (Polish) @ukr_leaks_pl | T3 | — | The Polish-language branch of a nine-language network run by a former Ukrainian security officer who defected to Russia. It translates and republishes the network's material for Polish readers. | The network and its operator were documented by the DFRLab in a report of 5 September 2023; the Polish channel was named in BBC News reporting of 1 July 2025. |
RSS & websites
Feeds of outlets and networks with documented attribution, aimed at Polish readers.
| Outlet | Tier | Country | What it is | Attribution & sources |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Myśl Polska | T3 | — | A Polish weekly with a long-standing pro-Kremlin line. It repeated the fabricated claim that over ten thousand Poles had died in Ukraine, then removed it from its website. | On 21 November 2023 the Belarusian state channel Belarus 24 announced joint projects between Belarusian state radio and Myśl Polska, describing it as developing information cooperation. That is an announced partnership with state media; we have not established whether it continues today. The publication's website was blocked by Poland's Internal Security Agency in 2022. |
Niezależny Dziennik Polityczny (website) | T3 | — | The website of the same operation as the Niezależny Dziennik Polityczny channel — an outlet posing as an independent Polish political daily while using invented journalist identities. | Attributed to a Russian information operation by Google Threat Intelligence Group in 2025, and documented earlier by the DFRLab and the Stanford Internet Observatory. The site was blocked by Poland's Internal Security Agency (ABW) in 2022. |
Pravda Polska (Portal Kombat) | T3 | — | The Polish node of the Pravda network: an automated site that republishes pro-Kremlin material for Polish readers rather than writing its own. About two-thirds of what it publishes is on the subjects this section covers. | Identified as part of the Portal Kombat network by VIGINUM, the French state agency for foreign digital interference, in its report of 12 February 2024; the network's worldwide expansion was subsequently tracked by DFRLab and CheckFirst in 2025. VIGINUM's finding is about the network, not a sanction against this site. |
X (Twitter)
Syto monitors these accounts' public posts. Being monitored is not an allegation about the account holder. Corrections: support.specialcat@gmail.com.
| Account | Tier | Country | What it is | Attribution & sources |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Russian Embassy in Poland (X) @rusemb_pl | T2 | — | The X account of Russia's embassy in Warsaw, which posts in Polish for Polish readers. We read it as a primary source of official Russian messaging aimed at Poland. | This is an official diplomatic mission of the Russian Federation. No attribution finding is needed or claimed: it is monitored because it is the state itself, addressing Poles in their own language. |
Spotted an inaccuracy in a receipt or a description? Write to us: support.specialcat@gmail.com. We act on attribution corrections faster than on anything else.