Sources — Israel

Every source here was checked and measured, not assumed. Before launch we opened each channel by hand and ran its real posts through the analysis, to see whether it actually produces Israel-directed narratives rather than merely having the pedigree for it. That measurement changed the roster: a Hebrew-language feed scored 24 out of 120 on the first pass and 99 out of 120 once the test accounted for how it works — in a Hebrew feed, content projecting Iranian power is Israel-directed by construction. A shallow score means measure better, never assume.

Two states, one roster. Most entries are Iranian state media or Iranian-run coordination hubs. The rest are Russian: they are here because their Russian-language output reaches Israel's Russian-speaking community, not because Russia and Iran are the same actor. Each entry says which it is and what was documented about it.

Being the state is a reason; an allegation is not. Several entries carry no attribution finding at all, and need none: an official broadcaster or a supreme leader's own account is monitored because it is the state itself, speaking in its own name. Where an entry does rest on a finding, that finding belongs to the organisation named in it — the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Microsoft, CEPA, Israel's Institute for National Security Studies, or a sanctions authority. We never attribute to a source a designation, charge or conviction that does not exist, and where a designation names a parent broadcaster rather than the specific channel, we say so.

Channels of proscribed organisations are deliberately absent. Some of them are unquestionably part of the information war aimed at Israel. Our archive stores what it reads, and in several of the jurisdictions we publish into, storing the output of a proscribed organisation is a question for counsel rather than for us. They sit on a documented do-not-enable list, with each operator's designation status recorded, so the gap is a decision on the record rather than an oversight.