Discrediting information policy through accusations of “censorship”

What it claims

Restricting access to pro-Russian resources is portrayed as total censorship and a violation of citizens' right to free choice of information. The authors urge users to bypass blocks to maintain influence over the Ukrainian audience during the information war.

Target audience

Examples (paraphrased)

We paraphrase rather than quote: propaganda's exact wording is built to spread, so we carry the claim and not the craft. Each example cites the post it came from.

• The Ukrainian authorities have blocked access to Fikrat Shabanov's channel, so viewers are advised to change their country settings on YouTube or use a VPN.

  Евгений Мураев, 18 Jul 2026

  t.me/murayevUA/1250

• Yevhen Murayev claims his channel is blocked in Ukraine and urges subscribers to decide for themselves what to watch, contrary to government bans.

  Евгений Мураев, 17 Jul 2026

  t.me/murayevUA/1249

We link archived copies rather than the posts themselves, so that checking our work sends no traffic to the source. Where a platform cannot be archived, we print the post's address instead of linking it.

Goal

To undermine trust in government decisions regarding information security and to portray Ukraine as an undemocratic state.

Techniques used

• Loaded LanguageUsing slogans like “no one should decide for you” to pit individual freedom against national security.
• Appeal to Fear / PrejudiceInstilling the idea that the state fully controls the information space and deprives citizens of the right to choose.

The real grievance it exploits

The natural irritation of users caused by technical restrictions on accessing familiar content and fears regarding the limitation of free speech.

How to counter

• Reframe: Blocking resources that spread hostile propaganda is a measure to protect national security, not a restriction on freedom of speech.
• Technique exposure: Propagandists use the rhetoric of “freedom of choice” to mask attempts to bypass sanctions and continue disinformation campaigns.

Sources (all time)

• Политика СтраныTier 1332,420 subscribers
  4 posts · 20–26 Aug 2026

  • 26 Aug · t.me/stranaua/246187
  • 20 Aug · t.me/stranaua/245602
  • 20 Aug · t.me/stranaua/245601
  • 20 Aug · t.me/stranaua/245598
• Margarita SimonyanTier 1560,000 followers
  1 post · 21 Aug 2026

  • 21 Aug · x.com/M_Simonyan/status/2090753075493384194
• MediaKillerTier 1104,225 subscribers
  1 post · 26 Aug 2026

  • 26 Aug · t.me/MediaKiller2021/24322
• Евгений МураевTier 184,682 subscribers
  17 posts · 15 Jul – 19 Sept 2026

  • 19 Sept · t.me/murayevUA/1299
  • 17 Sept · t.me/murayevUA/1295
  • 15 Sept · t.me/murayevUA/1292
  • 12 Sept · t.me/murayevUA/1288
  • 10 Sept · t.me/murayevUA/1285
  • 10 Sept · t.me/murayevUA/1283
  • 6 Sept · t.me/murayevUA/1277
  • 5 Sept · t.me/murayevUA/1274
  • 4 Sept · t.me/murayevUA/1273
  • 2 Sept · t.me/murayevUA/1271
  • +7 more
• ШЕЛЕСТTier 1138,769 subscribers
  1 post · 24 Aug 2026

  • 24 Aug · t.me/shelestlive/30935